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ELECTRICITY SECTOR RESTRUCTURING AND COMPETITION: 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 





We now have over a decade of experience with the privatization, restructuring, regulatory 
reform, and wholesale and retail competition in electricity sectors around the world.  The 
objectives and design attributes of these reform programs are reviewed.  The 
improvements in sector performance that have been achieved are discussed.  The nature 
and sources of performance problems are also reviewed.  Several lessons learned from 
this experience are identified and their implications for successful ongoing electricity 
reform initiatives presented.  Electricity sector restructuring, regulatory reform and 
competition initiatives can yield significant consumer benefits when these reforms are 
designed and implemented well.  Applying the lessons learned from recent experience 
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 During the 1990s, many developed and developing countries began to restructure 
their electric power sectors to improve their performance.  The restructuring programs 
have included privatization of state-owned enterprises, the separation of potentially 
competitive segments (generation and retail supply) from natural monopoly segments 
(distribution and transmission), the creation of competitive wholesale and retail markets, 
and the application of performance-based regulatory mechanisms (PBR) to the remaining 
regulated segments.  While these restructuring initiatives are ongoing, there is much to 
learn from both the successes and problems associated with the experience to date.  This 
paper provides a brief review of the performance of the reforms, lessons learned and the 
implications for future reforms. 
 
WHY RESTRUCTURING AND COMPETITION? 
Electricity sectors almost everywhere on earth evolved with (primarily) vertically 
integrated geographic monopolies that were either state-owned or privately-owned and 
subject to price and entry regulation as natural monopolies.  The primary components of 
electricity supply --- generation, transmission, distribution, and retail supply --- were 
integrated within individual electric utilities.  These firms in turn had de facto exclusive 
franchises to supply electricity to residential, commercial and industrial retail consumers 
within a defined geographic area.  The performance of these regulated monopolies varied 
widely across countries.  In many developing countries, the sectors were characterized by 
low labor productivity, poor service quality, high system losses, inadequate investment in 
power supply facilities, unavailability of service to large portions of the population, and 
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prices that were too low to cover costs and support new investment (World Bank 1994, 
Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001, Besant-Jones 1993).  Industrial customers sometimes had 
to respond to frequent system outages by building their own isolated generating facilities, 
increasing their costs of doing business.  Sector performance in developed countries was 
generally much better, but high operating costs, construction cost overruns on new 
facilities, costly programs driven by political pressures, and high retail prices required to 
cover these costs stimulated pressures for changes that would reduce costs and retail 
prices (Joskow 1998a, 2000). 
 The overriding reform goal has been to create new governance arrangements for 
the electricity sector that provide long-term benefits to consumers.  These benefits are to 
be realized by relying on competitive wholesale markets for power to provide better 
incentives for controlling construction and operating costs of new and existing generating 
capacity, to encourage innovation in power supply technologies, and to shift the risks of 
technology choice, construction cost and operating “mistakes” to suppliers and away 
from consumers.  Retail competition, or “customer choice,” is supposed to allow 
consumers to choose the retail power supplier offering the price/service quality 
combination that best meet their needs.  Competing retail suppliers were then expected to 
provide an enhanced array of retail service products, risk management, demand 
management, and new opportunities for service quality differentiation to better match 
individual consumer preferences. 
It has also been widely recognized that significant portions of the total costs of 
electricity supply --- distribution and transmission --- would continue to be regulated. 
Accordingly, reforms to traditional regulatory arrangements governing the distribution 
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and transmission networks have generally been viewed as an important complement to 
the introduction of wholesale and retail competition to supply consumer energy needs.   
Privatization of distribution and transmission companies combined with the application 
of PBR regulation imposes hard budget constraints on regulated network firms and 
provides better incentives for them to reduce costs and improve service quality (Joskow 
1998b).  In addition, the efficiency of competitive wholesale and retail markets depends 
on a well functioning supporting transmission and distribution network infrastructure. 
 
BASIC ARCHITECTURE FOR RESTRUCTURING AND COMPETITION 
 While a number of variations are potentially available (Hunt 2002, Joskow 2000, 
2003), the basic architecture for restructuring and the development of competitive markets 
for power involves several key components: 
a. Privatization of state-owned utilities. 
b. Vertical separation of competitive segments (e.g. generation, marketing and retail 
supply) from regulated segments (distribution, transmission, system operations) either 
structurally (through divestiture) or functionally (with internal “Chinese” walls 
separating affiliates within the same corporation). 
c. Horizontal integration of transmission and network operations to encompass the 
geographic expanse of “natural” wholesale markets and the designation of a single 
independent system operator to manage the operation the network, to schedule 
generation to meet demand and to maintain the physical parameters of the network 
(frequency, voltage, stability).   
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d. The creation of public wholesale spot energy and operating reserve market institutions 
to support requirements for real time balancing of supply and demand, to respond 
quickly and effectively to unplanned outages of transmission or generating facilities 
consistent with the need to maintain network voltage, frequency and stability 
parameters within narrow limits, and to facilitate economical trading opportunities 
among suppliers and between buyers and sellers.  
e. The application of regulatory rules and supporting network institutions to promote 
access to the transmission network by wholesale buyers and sellers in order to facilitate 
efficient competitive production and exchange, including mechanisms efficiently to 
allocate scarce transmission capacity among competing network users.  
f. The unbundling of retail tariffs to separate prices for retail power supplies and 
associated customer services to be supplied competitively from distribution and 
transmission services that would continue to be provided by regulated monopolies.  
This makes it possible for retail consumers eligible to choose their power suppliers 
competitively to purchase their power supplies from competing retail suppliers.  The 
competitive retail suppliers in turn must buy their power in wholesale markets, or own 
generating facilities to support their retail supply commitments, and then deliver the 
power for a fee over the regulated distribution network to meet their retail customers’ 
demand for electricity. 
g. Where retail competition is not available (e.g. for domestic and small commercial 
customers), distribution companies would continue to have the responsibility to supply 
these customers by purchasing power in competitive wholesale markets or, if they 
choose, to build their own generating facilities to provide power supplies.  Hoiwever, in 
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the latter case the associated charges for power would be subject to wholesale market-
based regulatory benchmarks.  
h. Independent regulatory agencies with good information about the costs, service quality 
and comparative performance of the firms supplying regulated network services, the 
authority to enforce regulatory requirements, and an expert staff to use this information 
and authority to regulate effectively the prices charged by distribution and transmission 
companies and the terms and conditions of access to these networks by wholesale and 
retail suppliers of power, are also an important but underappreciated component of 
successful reforms.  Regulators should rely on well-designed PBR mechanisms that 
meet budget balance, rent extraction and efficiency criteria, given the information 
available to them (Joskow 1998b) and must create a stable and credible regulatory 
environment that will support the attraction of the capital needed to improve the 
performance and expand the regulated network platforms upon which competition 
depends. 
ELECTRICITY’S UNUSUAL COMBINATION OF ATTRRIBUTES  
Electricity has an unusual set of physical and economic attributes that significantly 
complicate the task of successfully replacing hierarchies (vertical and horizontal  
integration) with decentralized market mechanisms.  These attributes must be recognized 
and incorporated into the successful design of competitive market and regulatory 
institutions (Joskow 2003) to avoid performance failures.   These attributes include: 
a. Electricity cannot be stored economically and demand must be cleared with “just-in-
time” production from generating capacity available to the network at (almost) 
exactly the same time that the electricity is consumed.  Physical laws governing 
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electricity network operations in real time to maintain frequency, voltage and stability 
of the network, along with network congestion and physical losses, interact with non-
storability to require that supply and demand be cleared continuously at every 
location on the network.  Network congestion, combined with non-storability, may 
limit significantly the geographic expanse of competition by constraining the ability 
of remote suppliers to compete, further enhancing market power problems.  Creating 
a set of complete markets that operate this quickly, at so many locations, and without 
creating market power problems is a significant challenge. 
b. The short-run demand elasticity for electricity is very low and supply gets very 
inelastic at high demand levels as capacity constraints are approached.  As a result, 
spot electricity prices are inherently very volatile and unusually susceptible to the 
creation of opportunities for suppliers to exercise market power unilaterally.   
c.  Loop flow, resulting from the physics of power flows on AC networks, introduces 
additional complex interactions between generators at different points on the network, 
creating unusual opportunities for suppliers to take actions unilaterally to affect 
adversely market prices, complicating the definition of property rights, and creating 
coordination and free riding problems.   
d. The combination of non-storability, real time variations in demand, low demand 
elasticity, random real time failures of generation and transmission equipment, the 
need to continuously clear supply and demand at every point on the network to meet 
the physical constraints on reliable network operations, means that some source of 
real time “inventory” is required to keep the system in balance.  This “inventory” is 
generally provided by “standby” generators that can respond very quickly to changing 
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supply and demand conditions, though demand side responses can also theoretically 
provide equivalent services as well.  Compatible market mechanisms for procuring 
and effectively operating these “ancillary services” are therefore necessary but 
difficult to design. 
These attributes affect the design of efficient market and regulatory institutions.   The 
failure to carefully integrate these attributes into the design of regulatory and market 
institutions has created market performance problems.  
 
RESTRUCTURING AND COMPETITION HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 
 When electricity restructuring and competition programs are designed and 
implemented well, electricity sector performance can improve significantly.  The 
performance improvements come from a combination of institutional reforms: 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, vertical and horizontal restructuring to facilitate 
competition and mitigate potential self-dealing and cross-subsidization problems, PBR 
regulation applied to the regulated transmission and distribution segments, good 
wholesale market designs that facilitate efficient competition among existing generators, 
competitive entry of new generators, and retail competition, at least for industrial 
customers.  The evidence is compelling: 
a. Privatization and the application of high-powered regulatory mechanisms has led to 
improvements in labor productivity and service quality in electric distribution systems 
in England and Wales, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, New Zealand and other 
countries (Newbery and Pollitt 1997, Rudnick and Zolezzi 2001, Bacon and Besant-
Jones 2001, Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 1998). Sectors that had experienced 
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physical distribution losses due to poor maintenance and antiquated equipment, as 
well as resulting from thefts of electric service, have generally experienced significant 
reductions in both types of losses.  Penetration rates for the availability of electricity 
to the population have increased in those countries where service was not already 
universally available and queues for connections have been shortened.  Distribution 
and transmission network outages have declined.  Improved performance of regulated 
distribution (and sometimes transmission) systems has accompanied privatization and 
the application of high-powered PBR mechanisms almost everywhere it has been 
implemented. 
b. The performance of existing generating plants that have been privatized and required 
to operate in competitive wholesale markets has generally improved dramatically 
(Newbery and Pollit 1997, Rudnick and Zolezzi 2001).  Old inefficient and 
uneconomic generating facilities have been retired.  Costly political preferences for 
using domestic fuels and equipment have been undercut by the need for private 
generating companies to reduce costs to compete successfully.  
c. Substantial amounts of capital have been mobilized to support construction of new 
efficient generating capacity in many countries that have implemented reforms.  In 
the U.S., about 150,000 Mw of new generating capacity, most of it merchant 
capacity, has begun operating in the last five years.  About 40% of the stock of 
generating plants in service in England and Wales has been replaced with modern 
efficient combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology as old coal-burning 
generators have been closed and expensive dirty coal plants have been displaced by 
cheaper and cleaner CCGT capacity (Newbery and Pollitt 1997).  Many other 
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countries implementing reforms have also attracted significant investment in both 
distribution infrastructure and existing and new generating capacity (Jamasb 2002). 
However, generation and transmission investment incentives remain an issue in many 
developed countries, as I shall discuss presently, and the poor financial experience of 
foreign investors in Latin America, East Asia, India and Pakistan has led to a 
significant decline in foreign investment in these countries’ electricity sectors since 
the late 1990s. 
d. Wholesale electricity prices in England and Wales, in much of Europe, in Australia, 
and in several Latin American countries have fallen (controlling for fuel price 
changes) as competitive wholesale markets have developed and entry of new 
generating capacity has expanded supplies and increased competition. 
e. Retail electricity prices have become better aligned with electricity supply costs as a 
consequence of better regulation of distribution and transmission charges and the 
diffusion of retail competition, especially for larger industrial customers.  In some 
countries this has meant increasing retail prices that previously had been too low, but 
especially developed countries, retail prices have generally fallen to reflect reductions 
in costs (Jamasb 2002, Chisari, Estache, and Romero 1997). 
 
THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS 
 Electricity restructuring and competition initiatives have also exhibited to a 
number of performance disappointments and problems, making ongoing reforms 
necessary.  These problems include: 
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a. Market power in spot wholesale power and operating reserve markets.  Significant 
wholesale market power problems have been identified empirically in a number of 
countries using both ex post empirical evidence and ex ante simulation models 
(Wolfram 1999, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak 2002, Joskow and Kahn 2002).  The 
problems can be attributed to the interactions between the attributes of electricity 
networks noted above, too few competing generating companies, wholesale market 
design flaws, vertical integration between transmission and generation that creates the 
incentive and opportunity for exclusionary behavior, excessive reliance on spot 
markets rather than forward contracts, and limited diffusion of real time prices and 
associated communications and control technology that facilitates the participant of 
demand in wholesale spot markets.  As a result, market power mitigation strategies 
have become an important component of wholesale market reforms. However, efforts 
to mitigate market power with restrictions on bidding behavior and price caps, rather 
than with structural remedies (e.g. divestiture of generating plants by firms with 
market power, mandatory forward contracts, and market design improvements), may 
have caused more harm than good and adversely affected investments in new 
generating capacity. 
b.  The most efficient design of spot wholesale energy markets continues to be a subject 
of dispute among interest groups and independent experts (Joskow 2003, Hunt 2002, 
Stoft 2002).   Should the market be built around a pool or rely on bilateral contracts?  
Should there be locational pricing of energy and operating reserves?  How should 
scarce transmission capacity be allocated?  Should transmission rights be physical or 
financial (Hogan 1992, Joskow and Tirole 2000)?  While there is some room for 
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flexibility, and some of the disputes reflect the self-serving arguments of interest 
groups that expect to benefit from inefficient markets, I believe that the experience to 
date supports the desirability of several basic wholesale market design features.  
These basic design features include the creation of voluntary public spot markets for 
energy and ancillary services (day-ahead and real time balancing) that accommodate 
bilateral contracts and self-scheduling of generation; locational pricing reflecting the 
marginal cost of congestion and losses at each location; the integration of spot 
wholesale markets for energy with the efficient allocation of scarce transmission 
capacity; auctioning of (physical or financial) contingent transmission rights that are 
simultaneously feasible under alternative system conditions to hedge congestion, 
serve as a basis for incentives for good performance by system operators and 
transmission owners, and partially to support new transmission investment; an active 
demand side that can respond to spot market price signals (Borenstein, Jaske and 
Rosenfeld 2002).   The allocation of transmission rights can affect the incentives of 
firms to exercise market power and this should be taken into account in the design of 
rights allocation mechanisms and restrictions on the entities that can purchase these 
rights (Joskow and Tirole 2000, Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery 2002).  
c. No market design will work well if there are not an adequate number of competitive 
suppliers of generation service or the market power of dominant firms has not been 
mitigated in some way (i.e. with regulated forward contracts).  There should be a 
large number of competing suppliers of generation service and deep liquid bilateral 
forward wholesale markets for physical and financial contracts for power. 
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d. Independent market monitors are necessary to identify behavior by market 
participants that distorts market prices from competitive levels and market design 
flaws that create opportunities for market participants to profit from inefficient 
strategic behavior. 
e. Retail competition initiatives have often worked well for large industrial and 
commercial customers. But the benefits for residential and small commercial 
customers are yet to be demonstrated compared to alternative procurement 
arrangements that retain distribution company responsibilities for supplying smaller 
customers by procuring power in competitive wholesale markets (Green 2000, 
Joskow 2003).  Providing electricity supplies competitively to small customers is 
relatively costly and these customers have proven to be quite “sticky,” creating 
potential market power problems.  Developing and applying viable models to deliver 
the benefits of wholesale market competition to smaller customers is an ongoing 
reform challenge. 
f. Stimulating performance improvements in the operation of transmission networks 
and, especially, attracting adequate investment to reduce congestion and to increase 
the geographic expanse of competition to reduce market power and the associated 
need to regulate wholesale markets to mitigate it, has been a challenge.  The 
transmission systems that have exhibited the best performance are organized with a 
single independent transmission company that spans a large geographic area, 
integrates system dispatch, congestion management, network maintenance and 
investment under PBR regulation (e.g. NGC in England and Wales).  Fragmented 
transmission ownership, separation of system operations from transmission 
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maintenance and investment, and poorly designed incentive regulation mechanisms 
reduce performance (Joskow 2003).  Relying primarily on market-based “merchant 
transmission” investment, that is where new transmission investments must be fully 
supported by congestion rents (the difference in locational prices times the capacity of 
a new link) is likely to lead to inefficient investment in transmission capacity (Joskow 
and Tirole 2003). 
g. Creating appropriate investment incentives for new generating capacity is a growing 
problem in many countries.  The environment for financing new generating 
investments has changed dramatically in the last two years as a result of financial 
problems for merchant trading and generating companies in Europe, the U.S. and 
Latin America  as well as macroeconomic instability (Joskow 2003, Jamasb 2002, De 
Araujo 2001).  Investors are looking for stable market rules and longer term 
contractual commitments before they will commit capital.  Financing investments in 
peaking capacity, which relies heavily on wholesale market prices creating “rents” to 
support fixed investment costs in a relatively small number of hours is especially 
problematic.  A number of countries are considering imposing resource adequacy or 
forward contracting commitments on the entities that provide retail service to 
overcome imperfections in wholesale spot markets to restore incentives for 
investments in generating capacity and demand response capabilities consistent with 
traditional reliability levels (Joskow 2003). 
h. Regulatory institutions that are independent, are well staffed and have access to 
necessary information about costs, prices, and service quality continue to be an 
important linchpin of successful electricity reform programs.  Inadequate attention 
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 Structural, regulatory and market reforms have been applied to electricity sectors 
in many countries around the world.  Significant performance improvements have been 
observed in many countries as a result of these reforms, especially in countries where the 
performance of state-owned monopolies was especially poor.  Privatization and PBR 
mechanism applied to regulated distribution companies has generally yielded significant 
performance improvements.  Wholesale markets have also stimulated improved 
performance from existing generators and helped to mobilize significant investments in 
new generating capacity in several countries.   
However, efforts to create well functioning competitive wholesale and retail 
markets have revealed many significant challenges and the restructuring and competition 
reforms remain a work in progress in most countries.  The California electricity crisis 
(Joskow 2001), scandals involving energy trading companies like Enron, the failure of 
poorly designed reforms in countries such as Brazil, macroeconomic problems 
undermining investments in generally well designed systems as in Argentina, and 
ongoing political interference undermining private sector investments as in India and 
Pakistan, have certainly made policymakers more cautious (but not necessarily more 
thoughtful) about electricity sector reforms.  The challenges associated with successful 
reforms have sometimes been underestimated.  However, these problems and challenges 
do not imply that restructuring, regulatory reform, and promoting the development of 
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competitive wholesale and retail markets for power, are ill-advised.  The problems that 
have emerged are now much better understood and solutions to many of them are at hand.  
The electricity sector reform program should go forward taking account of the lessons 
that have been earned.  The primary question is whether governments properly can 
choose between competing solutions and have the political will to resist interest group 
pressures and pursue reforms that will lead to more efficient markets and better 
performance of the network platforms upon which competition depends. 
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